nps-response-handler
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection as it processes untrusted user-generated content (NPS comments) without security boundaries or sanitization. An attacker could embed instructions in a survey comment to manipulate the agent's drafted replies or proposed next steps.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted NPS scores and comments ingested via
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the workflow interpolates user comments directly into the context used for drafting replies without delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The agent can draft outgoing email replies and propose task assignments/owners.
- Sanitization: No input validation or filtering is implemented for the NPS comment field.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is a discrepancy in the skill's identity; the author is listed as
Builder.orgin the metadata, which is flagged by automated scanners as a malicious domain, while the developer context identifies the author asOnStartups. This manifest inconsistency is a common pattern in metadata poisoning or impersonation attempts.
Recommendations
- Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata