metro-ai-apps-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches skill configuration, metadata, and the live skill index from the vendor's official GitHub repositories.
- Evidence: Uses
curlandgh apito readskills-config.jsonand skillSKILL.mdfiles fromraw.githubusercontent.com/open-edge-platform/skillsandapi.github.com/repos/open-edge-platform/skillsinreferences/DISCOVERY.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Dynamically installs and executes delegate skills from the
open-edge-platformorganization using thenpx skillsCLI. - Evidence: The core functionality in
SKILL.mdStep 5 usesnpx skills add open-edge-platform/skills --skill <skill-name>to pull remote skill definitions into the environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes shell commands to manage the environment and invoke the delegated building blocks.
- Evidence: Utilizes
bashtools likenpx,git,gh,ls, andcurlto discover, install, and run skills as defined inSKILL.mdandreferences/DISCOVERY.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (business objectives) which influences the selection and configuration of tools and remote skills, representing an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: User-provided business objectives in
SKILL.mdStep 1. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a mandatory human-in-the-loop checkpoint in Step 4 ("WAIT for confirmation") before any installation or build action is taken.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
bash,git,gh, andnpx, enabling file system access and network operations. - Sanitization: No explicit content sanitization is described in the orchestrator instructions, relying on the user's manual review of the proposed plan.
Audit Metadata