multimodal-dataprep-user
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches deployment artifacts like
setup.shanddocker/compose.yamlfrom the official vendor repository on GitHub (github.com/open-edge-platform/edge-ai-libraries). These are legitimate resources required for the skill's stated purpose. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions guide the user through executing shell commands, including
docker compose,curl, andsource, to orchestrate the service stack on the local machine. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: An automated scan flagged a command where
curloutput is piped topython3. Analysis confirms this is a benign local health check that parses JSON fromhttp://localhost:6007/v1/dataprep/healthto verify service readiness. It does not execute untrusted remote code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data via media uploads and text summary ingestion.
- Ingestion points: API endpoints
POST /media/upload,POST /media/ingest, andPOST /summaryinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined in the prompts.
- Capability inventory: Limited to local shell commands (
curl,docker) interacting with the service API. - Sanitization: The skill documentation specifically notes that path traversal for local directory ingestion is restricted to a configured root (
MM_DATAPREP_INGEST_DATA_ROOT), demonstrating a security-conscious design.
Audit Metadata