gtm-enrichment-smart
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands (
curlandjq) using variables like{org_name}and{twitter_handle}derived from external API data. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the data providers return malicious strings designed to break out of the shell command context. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User-provided lead data, including email addresses and names, is shared with multiple external enrichment services such as Apollo, Hunter, Tomba, and Sixtyfour.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's operation depends on downloading data from various third-party enrichment APIs and the public GitHub API.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection surface is present because the agent is tasked with parsing and classifying information (company descriptions and keywords) from external sources that may contain adversarial content.
- Ingestion points: Data fields from Apollo, Hunter, Brand.dev, and Sixtyfour (e.g.,
description,keywords,industries) are processed in Phase 1 and 4. - Boundary markers: None; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: Execution of API calls via
orth runand shell commands viacurlandjq. - Sanitization: None; the skill lacks validation or escaping for the data interpolated into shell commands or processed by the LLM for classification.
Audit Metadata