higgsfield-marketing-studio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of external data from user-provided URLs and prompt strings to drive video generation models. This architecture presents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where an attacker-controlled product page or malicious user input could attempt to subvert the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the
urlparameter in theshow_marketing_studiotool and thepromptparameter ingenerate_video, as documented inSKILL.mdsections 3, 6, and 7. - Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using negative constraints (e.g., "ABSOLUTELY NO PACKSHOT" in
SKILL.mdsection 10.8) and structured prompt beats, but lack explicit delimiters to isolate untrusted user content from system instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
generate_videoandshow_marketing_studioMCP tools. It also references local verification scripts such asscripts/build_index.pyandscripts/seedance_lint.pyas seen inSKILL.mdsections 1 and 14. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping mechanisms applied to the external URLs or prompt content before they are processed by the generative models.
Audit Metadata