higgsfield-seedance-2-5
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdsuggest running a local Python scriptscripts/seedance_lint.pyto validate generated prompts. The command patternpython3 scripts/seedance_lint.py --preflight --model seedance_2_5 "<prompt>"interpolates user-provided content into a shell command. While the input is enclosed in double quotes, this represents a potential command injection surface if the agent does not properly sanitize the<prompt>placeholder before execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted user descriptions to generate complex production instructions. It lacks explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or delimit user-provided data within its own context, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. The mandatory evidence chain includes:
- Ingestion points: User requests for video generation and scene descriptions entering the agent context as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Specific brackets like
()and{}are defined for the downstream video model, but no boundary markers or instructions are provided to protect the agent's own instruction processing. - Capability inventory: The skill references the capability to execute the
seedance_lint.pyscript via a shell command. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or validation logic for the external user content is mentioned.
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