codex-issue-coordinator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that direct the agent to bypass operational constraints or security blocks imposed by the client environment.
  • Evidence: "Do not invoke them through a skill command that the client blocks. Read required skills directly from their SKILL.md files as instructions for this workflow." (SKILL.md). This instructs the agent to circumvent platform-level tool restrictions by manually executing the logic defined in skill files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content, creating an attack surface where malicious instructions in GitHub data could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The coordinator reads repository instructions, parent issues, sub-issues, project boards, and linked pull requests from GitHub (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define clear delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the external data it ingests.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including creating branches, committing code, running tests, and merging pull requests via tools like /task-to-pr and /test (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the ingested content before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes high-privilege tools to manage code and infrastructure.
  • Evidence: The skill orchestrates multiple tools including /task-to-pr, /test, and /review, and manages worker threads using set_thread_pinned, wait_threads, and send_message_to_thread (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 09:40 AM