factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from GitHub issues, specifications, or task descriptions, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the task-to-PR workflow.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts a
<spec, task, or GitHub issue>as an argument and reads source repository instructions (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to treat the external content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the authority to perform GitHub operations (merging PRs, updating issues) and delegates code-related tasks to the
/task-to-prskill. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for instructions embedded within the external task descriptions.
Audit Metadata