task-to-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from tasks, tickets, and pull requests to guide its actions, creating an attack surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via task descriptions, tickets, milestones, or pull request content provided in the arguments.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or directives to treat ingested task data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools for code generation, execution of tests via
/test, code review via/review, and GitHub operations (commit, push, PR creation, and merging) via the GitHub CLI. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external task content before it is used to influence code changes or command execution.
Audit Metadata