task-to-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources including Markdown specifications, GitHub issues, and task descriptions which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence agent behavior during implementation or verification.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts external input via the argument-hint
<specs, tasks, issues, PRs, or milestone>and reads repository instructions and requirements. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate untrusted task content from the agent's internal operational logic, nor instructions to disregard instructions found within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including reading source code, creating branches and worktrees, writing files (implementing tasks), committing code, pushing to remote repositories, and executing test suites via the
/testtool. - Sanitization: The skill lacks specified mechanisms for validating or sanitizing external input before it is used to direct implementation or verify behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves several operations that execute commands within the user's environment, including branch management, git operations (commit, push, merge), and the invocation of external tools like
/testand/reviewfor code verification.
Audit Metadata