GitHub PR comment fetcher
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/gather-reviews.tsscript usesexecSyncto execute thegh(GitHub CLI) command. It constructs the command string by directly interpolating theownerandnamevariables, which are derived from user-supplied command-line arguments. An attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands by providing a repository string that includes shell metacharacters (e.g.,owner/repo"; <malicious_command>; #), enabling unauthorized code execution with the privileges of the agent. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted content from GitHub pull request comments and reviews. An attacker could place malicious instructions within a PR comment which, when fetched and presented to the agent, could influence its behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from the GitHub API using the
ghtool inscripts/gather-reviews.ts. - Boundary markers: The script wraps fetched comments in Markdown blockquotes (
>), but lacks explicit system instructions telling the agent to treat this content as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within the data. - Capability inventory: The environment provides capabilities for shell command execution (
execSync) and potential file system interaction. - Sanitization: The script performs basic newline replacement to maintain Markdown blockquote formatting but does not filter the content for malicious instructional patterns.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata