ai-engineer-expert
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements systems designed to process untrusted external data, creating a potential vulnerability surface.
- Ingestion points: The
RAGSystem.ingest_documentsmethod andAIAgent.runmethod inSKILL.mdaccept raw text data and user inputs for processing by LLMs. - Boundary markers: The provided Python snippets lack explicit boundary markers or system instructions designed to prevent the model from executing instructions embedded within the ingested documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash(python:*),Write, andEdittools, which could be misused if a prompt injection attack succeeds. - Sanitization: While the documentation mentions sanitization as a best practice, the implementation examples do not include logic for filtering or validating external content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The AI Agent implementation utilizes dynamic execution patterns to perform tasks.
- Evidence: The
AIAgent.execute_toolmethod inSKILL.mdtakes LLM-generated tool names and arguments, parsing them viajson.loadsand then executing them using Python's argument unpacking (**arguments) into function calls. This is a standard but dynamic execution pattern for agentic systems.
Audit Metadata