autonomous-coding-agents
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSOBFUSCATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed entirely around executing external CLI tools (
claude,codex,opencode,agy) that perform autonomous file system and shell operations. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Several configurations explicitly encourage bypassing security prompts and permission checks:
- Recommends using
--dangerously-skip-permissionswith Claude Code to auto-approve file writes, shell commands, and network access. - Suggests using
--sandbox danger-full-accesswith Codex to bypass bubblewrap/sandboxing when environment errors occur. - Recommends using
--yolomode for Codex which provides no sandbox and no manual approvals for faster execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates remote code execution by design, as the delegated agents (Claude, Codex, OpenCode) autonomously fetch and execute logic from their respective model providers based on the task prompt.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides instructions for installing external agent software from npm and official taps (e.g.,
@anthropic-ai/claude-code,@openai/codex,opencode-ai). These are recognized well-known services, and while the installation itself is standard, the subsequent autonomous behavior of the tools is the primary risk factor. - [OBFUSCATION]: In
references/opencode-cli-legacy.md, the skill instructs sending a raw hex escape sequence\x03(Ctrl+C) to the terminal to exit sessions. While used for a legitimate purpose (process termination), sending raw hex codes to a shell can be a medium-risk pattern for hiding commands.
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