planning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the local codebase during the context gathering phase, which could potentially contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Codebase files, CLAUDE.md, and existing plan documents in docs/plans/ as directed by the instructions in Phase 1.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested codebase files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write plan documents to the file system (docs/plans/) and dispatch subagents via the Agent tool as specified in the Phase 4 and Subagent Dispatch sections of SKILL.md.
- Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation logic for the content read from the codebase before it is interpolated into plans or instructions for subagents.
Audit Metadata