avoid-ai-writing-router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an orchestration layer for processing user-supplied text and files, which constitutes an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the workflow via the
pasted_textandnamed_filefields in the handoff envelope defined inreferences/handoff-contract.md. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a structured YAML handoff envelope to maintain context boundaries between different processing stages.
- Capability inventory: The orchestration graph includes routes to skills with file system write capabilities (
file-edit-in-place). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization logic is present in the provided validation scripts; security relies on the guardrails and safety protocols of the downstream specialized skills.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The project includes a test script that executes local Python code to validate the orchestration graph.
- Evidence: The file
scripts/validate_connections.test.pyutilizessubprocess.runto execute the sibling scriptscripts/validate_connections.py. - Context: This is a standard development tool for verifying graph integrity and does not interact with untrusted remote sources or pass unvalidated user input to the shell.
Audit Metadata