codebase-to-course
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (source code) during Phase 1 (Codebase Analysis), which establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions embedded in a processed codebase could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the curriculum design or module writing phases.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Phase 1) specifies reading all key files from a cloned GitHub repository or local directory.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are defined for the analysis of the ingested code.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read files, create directories, execute shell commands (git clone, bash), and write HTML/JS files.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content validation for the source code being analyzed is documented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform shell operations, including
git clone <url>with user-provided URLs and executing a local assembly script (bash build.sh). While these are core to the skill's workflow, they represent a point where unvalidated input (such as a malformed repository URL) could be interpolated into a shell command. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The generated course template (found in
references/_base.htmlandreferences/styles.css) references the Google Fonts CDN (fonts.googleapis.com). This is a well-known, trusted service used for legitimate design purposes and does not pose a security risk.
Audit Metadata