codex-router-media

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to build and execute shell commands (e.g., media video --prompt "TEXT") where the parameters are directly populated from user input. This pattern presents a significant risk of command injection if the input text contains shell metacharacters that are not properly sanitized or escaped before the tool is invoked.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a dynamic discovery pattern to locate its executable by reading from a JSON manifest file (~/.codex/codex-router/install-manifest.json). Executing code from paths resolved at runtime is a risk factor as it could be redirected to unauthorized binaries if the manifest file is modified by a malicious process.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external inputs including user-provided prompts and external image URLs, creating a surface for adversarial content to influence the agent's actions.
  • Ingestion points: The --prompt and --text flags accept raw user text, and the --image flag accepts external URLs or local file paths.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the shell tool for command execution and has the ability to write files to the local filesystem using the --out flag.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of input validation, escaping, or filtering to prevent malicious payloads in the external sources from affecting the host system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 9, 2026, 03:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — codex-router-media