codex-router-media
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to build and execute shell commands (e.g.,
media video --prompt "TEXT") where the parameters are directly populated from user input. This pattern presents a significant risk of command injection if the input text contains shell metacharacters that are not properly sanitized or escaped before the tool is invoked. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a dynamic discovery pattern to locate its executable by reading from a JSON manifest file (
~/.codex/codex-router/install-manifest.json). Executing code from paths resolved at runtime is a risk factor as it could be redirected to unauthorized binaries if the manifest file is modified by a malicious process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external inputs including user-provided prompts and external image URLs, creating a surface for adversarial content to influence the agent's actions.
- Ingestion points: The
--promptand--textflags accept raw user text, and the--imageflag accepts external URLs or local file paths. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the shell tool for command execution and has the ability to write files to the local filesystem using the
--outflag. - Sanitization: There is no mention of input validation, escaping, or filtering to prevent malicious payloads in the external sources from affecting the host system.
Audit Metadata