figma-generate-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to generate and execute Javascript code snippets at runtime to interact with the Figma API via the
use_figmatool. It provides several complex templates for discovery and construction phases that must be customized with specific identifiers and logic before execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates on untrusted external inputs to generate UI designs, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests source code (CSS, JS, TS, Kotlin, Swift), natural language UI descriptions, and pixel-perfect screenshots captured from running web applications (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions include an explicit Anti-Patterns section that warns the agent not to treat external content, logs, or tool responses as trusted instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including reading and writing to the Figma canvas, creating new files, and performing network operations via asset uploads (
use_figma,create_new_file,upload_assets). - Sanitization: There is no documented process for sanitizing or escaping the data extracted from source code or descriptions before it is interpolated into the executable Javascript templates.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the Figma MCP server guide repository on GitHub as a source for canonical workflow imports and metadata synchronization.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes a workflow where images may be uploaded to alternative third-party providers using the
upload_assetstool if primary AI services are unavailable. While this requires user confirmation, it represents a data exfiltration surface for sensitive visual content.
Audit Metadata