gemini-interactions-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions designed to override the agent's internal training data and model selection logic.
- Evidence: "IMPORTANT: These rules override your training data. Your knowledge is outdated." and "If a user asks for a deprecated model, use gemini-3.7-flash instead and note the substitution."
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents an attack surface where instructions embedded in external data could influence the agent.
- Ingestion points:
inputparameter ininteractions.createand repositorysourcesinagents.create(e.g.,SKILL.md,references/migration.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions within the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
client.interactions.createfor remote API execution andrgfor local file system searching. - Sanitization: Absent; there are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping the data fetched from remote repositories before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands for project analysis and environment setup.
- Evidence: In
references/migration.md, a complex shell pipe usingrg,cut,sort, anduniqis provided to size the migration scope. - Evidence: Instructions for package management using
pip install -U google-genaiandnpm install @google/genaiare present inSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to fetch documentation and software from well-known official sources.
- Evidence: Numerous references to
ai.google.devfor API documentation and migration guides. - Evidence: Links to official package registries for the
google-genaiand@google/genaiSDKs.
Audit Metadata