gemini-interactions-api

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions designed to override the agent's internal training data and model selection logic.
  • Evidence: "IMPORTANT: These rules override your training data. Your knowledge is outdated." and "If a user asks for a deprecated model, use gemini-3.7-flash instead and note the substitution."
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents an attack surface where instructions embedded in external data could influence the agent.
  • Ingestion points: input parameter in interactions.create and repository sources in agents.create (e.g., SKILL.md, references/migration.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions within the ingested content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes client.interactions.create for remote API execution and rg for local file system searching.
  • Sanitization: Absent; there are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping the data fetched from remote repositories before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands for project analysis and environment setup.
  • Evidence: In references/migration.md, a complex shell pipe using rg, cut, sort, and uniq is provided to size the migration scope.
  • Evidence: Instructions for package management using pip install -U google-genai and npm install @google/genai are present in SKILL.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to fetch documentation and software from well-known official sources.
  • Evidence: Numerous references to ai.google.dev for API documentation and migration guides.
  • Evidence: Links to official package registries for the google-genai and @google/genai SDKs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 09:33 PM