huggingface-community-evals
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill scripts (
inspect_eval_uv.py,inspect_vllm_uv.py,lighteval_vllm_uv.py) usesubprocess.run()to execute external evaluation tools likeinspectandlighteval. - Evidence: Commands are constructed as lists (e.g.,
cmd = ["inspect", "eval", task, ... ]) and executed withoutshell=True, which is a best practice to mitigate command injection risks. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides support for the
--trust-remote-codeflag in its scripts and examples. - Evidence: This flag is passed directly to underlying libraries (
transformers,vllm,lighteval), enabling the execution of custom code defined within Hugging Face model repositories. This is a standard but high-risk feature of the ML ecosystem that requires user trust in the model source. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external model data and task definitions from the Hugging Face Hub.
- Evidence:
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts user-provided model IDs and task names via CLI arguments in all three main scripts.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are injected into the prompts by the skill wrapper.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.runand perform network operations via the underlying evaluation libraries. - Sanitization: The
inspect_eval_uv.pyscript performs minimal normalization on task names (e.g.,_normalize_task), but otherwise relies on downstream tools for data sanitization.
Audit Metadata