pptx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation of an embedded C shim to ensure compatibility in restricted or sandboxed environments.
  • File: scripts/office/soffice.py
  • Evidence: The script contains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) which it writes to a temporary file and compiles using gcc -shared -fPIC. The resulting shared object is then injected into the soffice process environment using the LD_PRELOAD variable to intercept socket calls.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external system utilities to render slides and perform diffing operations.
  • Files: scripts/thumbnail.py, scripts/office/validators/redlining.py
  • Evidence: Uses subprocess.run to call soffice (LibreOffice), pdftoppm (Poppler), and git diff.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of several external dependencies from public registries.
  • File: SKILL.md
  • Evidence: Recommends installing markitdown, Pillow, and pptxgenjs. Additional Node.js packages like react-icons and sharp are also mentioned in the documentation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from PowerPoint files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md, scripts/office/unpack.py (processing user-provided .pptx files).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; text extracted from presentations is processed by the agent without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (gcc, soffice, git) and file system access across all scripts.
  • Sanitization: While the skill uses defusedxml for secure XML parsing, it lacks sanitization or escaping for the natural language content extracted from slide text boxes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 7, 2026, 06:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pptx