pulling-updates-from-skills-repository
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various shell commands using
gitto manage local repository state, includingstatus,fetch,merge, andloginSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow concludes by executing a local script located at a relative path
../using-skills/find-skillsto verify update success as specified in Step 8. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes data from an external, potentially untrusted source (upstream Git repository).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
git log HEAD..@{u}in Step 4 and through manual inspection of conflicted files in Step 6. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to treat the remote commit messages or diffs as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands including
gitand thefind-skillsscript, and modify the local file system. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not perform any validation, filtering, or escaping of the content retrieved from the remote repository before presenting it to the agent or user.
Audit Metadata