skill-installer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to download and install executable scripts and configuration files from external GitHub repositories into the agent's local environment paths (e.g., ~/.codex/skills or ~/.claude/skills).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installer fetches repository content from GitHub through direct ZIP archive downloads from codeload.github.com and repository cloning via git.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/install-skill-from-github.py uses the subprocess module to execute git binary commands for handling sparse checkouts and branch selection.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As an installer, the skill provides an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in remote repositories can be ingested into the agent's environment.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/install-skill-from-github.py fetches external archives and repository data from user-provided URLs.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill assumes the content fetched at the destination is a legitimate and safe skill.
  • Capability inventory: scripts/install-skill-from-github.py (subprocess.run, shutil.copytree) and scripts/github_utils.py (urllib.request).
  • Sanitization: Implements directory traversal validation in _safe_extract_zip to prevent files from being written outside the intended destination directory.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The helper module scripts/github_utils.py is configured to read GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN from the environment to facilitate authenticated API requests to GitHub. While this aligns with standard secret management practices for developer tools, it involves the handling of sensitive credentials.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 9, 2026, 03:53 AM