skill-installer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to download and install executable scripts and configuration files from external GitHub repositories into the agent's local environment paths (e.g.,
~/.codex/skillsor~/.claude/skills). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installer fetches repository content from GitHub through direct ZIP archive downloads from
codeload.github.comand repository cloning viagit. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/install-skill-from-github.pyuses thesubprocessmodule to executegitbinary commands for handling sparse checkouts and branch selection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As an installer, the skill provides an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in remote repositories can be ingested into the agent's environment.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/install-skill-from-github.pyfetches external archives and repository data from user-provided URLs. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill assumes the content fetched at the destination is a legitimate and safe skill.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/install-skill-from-github.py(subprocess.run, shutil.copytree) andscripts/github_utils.py(urllib.request). - Sanitization: Implements directory traversal validation in
_safe_extract_zipto prevent files from being written outside the intended destination directory. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The helper module
scripts/github_utils.pyis configured to readGITHUB_TOKENorGH_TOKENfrom the environment to facilitate authenticated API requests to GitHub. While this aligns with standard secret management practices for developer tools, it involves the handling of sensitive credentials.
Audit Metadata