using-git-worktrees
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface where instructions or configurations within an untrusted repository could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
CLAUDE.mdto determine directory preferences and parses project manifest files such aspackage.json,requirements.txt,Cargo.toml,go.mod, andpyproject.tomlto decide which setup commands to run (evidence inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to wrap external content in delimiters or to treat data from these files as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution for
git,npm,cargo,pip,poetry,go, and project-specific test runners likepytestornpm test(documented inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation is mentioned for variables like
$BRANCH_NAMEor directory paths before they are used in shell commands. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to perform extensive shell operations, including the automated installation of dependencies and execution of test suites. While these are common developer tasks, they are executed based on the presence of files within the local environment.
Audit Metadata