voice-preserving-rewriter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingest untrusted data in the form of user requests and draft text, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the user request and input text identified in Step 1 of the Workflow in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The skill instructions protect specific content types (e.g., quoted material, code blocks) but do not define global delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands in the source text.
- Capability inventory: The skill is scoped to text transformation; the provided scripts and instructions do not include subprocess calls, direct file writes, or network operations, limiting the impact of any potential injection.
- Sanitization: While the skill contains an Anti-Pattern warning against treating external content as trusted instructions, it does not detail specific input sanitization or filtering logic for the text being rewritten.
Audit Metadata