job-search

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requests Bash(crontab *) permissions to facilitate its daily automated search feature. This allows the agent to modify the user's system-level task scheduler.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill's primary feature is an automated daily search implemented via a crontab entry, which establishes persistence on the host system to run the agent periodically.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts data from external sources (hiring.cafe and various employer career pages) to evaluate job fit. Because this untrusted content is used as context for the agent's decision-making without sanitization, it creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Job results extraction from hiring.cafe (SKILL.md Step 2) and job description extraction from employer career sites (SKILL.md Step 5).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are specified when processing extracted web content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has read/write access to ~/.proficiently/, browser automation capabilities via mcp__claude-in-chrome__*, and shell command execution via Bash(crontab *).
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the data extracted from external websites before it is processed by the agent.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive personal information, specifically the user's resume and a LinkedIn contact list (linkedin-contacts.csv). While used for the stated purpose of job matching, this provides the agent (and potentially subverted sessions) access to PII and professional network data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 11:13 PM