job-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requests
Bash(crontab *)permissions to facilitate its daily automated search feature. This allows the agent to modify the user's system-level task scheduler. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill's primary feature is an automated daily search implemented via a crontab entry, which establishes persistence on the host system to run the agent periodically.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts data from external sources (hiring.cafe and various employer career pages) to evaluate job fit. Because this untrusted content is used as context for the agent's decision-making without sanitization, it creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Job results extraction from hiring.cafe (SKILL.md Step 2) and job description extraction from employer career sites (SKILL.md Step 5).
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are specified when processing extracted web content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has read/write access to
~/.proficiently/, browser automation capabilities viamcp__claude-in-chrome__*, and shell command execution viaBash(crontab *). - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the data extracted from external websites before it is processed by the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive personal information, specifically the user's resume and a LinkedIn contact list (
linkedin-contacts.csv). While used for the stated purpose of job matching, this provides the agent (and potentially subverted sessions) access to PII and professional network data.
Audit Metadata