application-quality-assurance
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/with_server.pyutilizessubprocess.Popenwithshell=Trueto execute server start commands provided via the--serverargument. This implementation allows for arbitrary shell command execution, including command chaining (e.g., using;,&&, or|) with parameters supplied by the agent. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary commands. The script
scripts/with_server.pyis designed to take a sequence of arguments representing a command and execute it viasubprocess.runafter the servers have started. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is intended to interact with and extract data from external web applications, creating an attack surface where a malicious site could inject instructions to manipulate the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads application state via
page.content()andpage.locator().all()as described inexamples/element_discovery.pyand theSKILL.mddecision tree. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to the agent to treat external page content as potentially untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
scripts/with_server.pyand filesystem writes in theexamples/directory. - Sanitization: Content retrieved from web applications is processed directly without sanitization or validation logic.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions that discourage the agent from inspecting the source code of the provided helper scripts ("DO NOT read the source until you try running the script first"). This functions as a concealment tactic that attempts to limit the agent's awareness of the script's internal execution logic, such as the use ofshell=True.
Audit Metadata