rag-agent-builder

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements RAG patterns that ingest untrusted external data (retrieved context) and user-supplied queries, which are then interpolated directly into prompts. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions in the documents could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the system context via the context and documents variables in examples/basic_rag.py and examples/agentic_rag.py.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates in the examples (e.g., generate_answer and evaluate_retrieved_docs) do not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to disregard embedded commands in the context data.
  • Capability inventory: The system leverages the untrusted context to perform generation tasks and agentic reasoning decisions, such as those found in the AgenticRAG.decide_retrieval method.
  • Sanitization: The implementation lacks evidence of text sanitization, validation, or escaping for the external content before it is processed by the model.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 23, 2026, 04:59 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — rag-agent-builder