team-communication
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize data from several untrusted external sources, creating a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to gather content from Slack messages, emails, Google Drive documents, and external press as detailed in
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded within these external data sources.
- Capability inventory: The agent reads from these sources to generate internal company communications (newsletters, status updates, FAQs) which are then distributed to employees and leadership, creating a path for malicious content to reach a wide internal audience.
- Sanitization: There are no instructions for filtering, sanitizing, or validating the data retrieved from external sources before it is processed.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill contains inconsistent metadata regarding its licensing.
- The YAML frontmatter in
SKILL.mddescribes the license as "Proprietary," while theLICENSE.txtfile provided in the skill package contains the full text for the Apache License, Version 2.0.
Audit Metadata