content-engine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks by ingesting untrusted data from external URLs (YouTube transcripts, X/Twitter posts, and web links) and processing it through an AI subagent to generate drafts.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddefines a routing matrix that fetches content from YouTube, X, and general web links using auxiliary skills likechromium,twitter, andtranscript. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to isolate external content or prevent the subagent from following embedded instructions within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses a custom
storage-clitool to read/write ideas, drafts, and persona data, and utilizes an "Opus subagent" for drafting. - Sanitization: The "Fact-check" step in the pipeline (Section 3, Step 7) is designed for data accuracy regarding numbers and quotes but does not include sanitization for malicious instructions or prompt injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a custom tool,
storage-cli, and thejqutility to manage persistent data through shell-like commands. - Evidence:
references/orgbus-commands.mddocuments the use ofstorage-cliforget,push,patch, andputoperations across various storage paths likecontent/telegram/ideasandcontent/telegram/stance/core. It also demonstrates the use ofjqfor parsing JSON responses in shell snippets.
Audit Metadata