colab-ssh-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
mighty-colabpackage from PyPI and thegoogle-colab-clitool from a GitHub repository (github.com/googlecolab/google-colab-cli.git). While the GitHub repository belongs to a well-known service (Google Colab),mighty-colabis an external third-party package provided by the author as a workaround for official tool bugs. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill modifies the user's local
~/.ssh/configfile to add permanent host aliases (colab-agent,colab-shell) andProxyCommanddirectives. This modification persists across sessions and alters the local system's SSH behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to install tools (
uv tool install), clone repositories (git clone), and manage remote Colab sessions (colab new,colab ssh,colab stop). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts a user-defined session name and interpolates it directly into shell commands and the SSH configuration file.
- Ingestion points: The user-provided
<session_name>(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used in the command interpolation logic.
- Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution and file-writing to the sensitive
~/.ssh/configfile. - Sanitization: The skill relies on a natural language instruction to "Avoid spaces and shell-special characters" but lacks programmatic sanitization or validation, making it vulnerable if the agent fails to follow the constraint.
Audit Metadata