asc-aso-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from local metadata files and external keyword analysis tools, which constitutes a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads local files at
metadata/app-info/{locale}.jsonandmetadata/version/{latest-version}/{locale}.json. It also ingests data from external competitors via theextract_competitors_keywordstool in Astro MCP. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety boundaries for the data being read, nor do they include warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
ascCLI tool for managing App Store credentials (asc auth), search plans, and metadata synchronization. It also usesAstro MCPfor keyword data operations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or sanitization for the metadata fields (description, keywords, subtitle) before they are processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
ascCLI tool to perform various App Store management tasks. - The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands such as
asc app-tags list,asc optimize search plan, andasc metadata keywords apply. While these are legitimate functions for an ASO audit tool, they involve the execution of system commands based on skill logic and parameters.
Audit Metadata