agentforce-observe
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests production session traces and conversation logs from Salesforce Data Cloud (Phase 1). This data contains untrusted input from end-users which is processed to identify agent failures or regressions. The skill has the capability to modify and publish
.agentconfiguration files (Phase 3), creating a potential path for malicious instructions embedded in session data to influence the agent's logic. - Ingestion points: Conversation messages are retrieved from
ssot__AiAgentInteractionMessage__dlmandssot__AiAgentInteraction__dlmvia theAgentforceOptimizeService.clshelper. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the retrieved conversation logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash,Write, andEditpermissions, and performs automated edits to the.agentDSL file followed bysf agent publishcommands. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the retrieved session text is performed before it is presented to the agent or used to derive improvement logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
sfCLI to execute arbitrary Apex code viasf apex run. It uses here-docs and temporary files to pipe dynamically generated Apex scripts into the organization to perform data model checks and session queries. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a custom Apex class,
AgentforceOptimizeService.cls, which it deploys to the user's Salesforce organization during Phase 1 setup. This class performs dynamic SOQL and Data Cloud queries to extract internal session telemetry, including LLM prompts and responses.
Audit Metadata