sap-setup-btp-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local vendor-provided command-line tools to manage the environment discovery and manifest generation workflow.
- Evidence: Executes
./cookbookctlfor pilot status, account discovery, manifest validation, and local rendering of configuration files. - Evidence: Executes
btp login --ssoto facilitate secure user authentication via the official SAP BTP CLI when a session is not active. - Evidence: Runs
scripts/region-preflight/region-preflight.shto verify service availability in specific BTP regions before configuration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests configuration data from local template files to scaffold agent manifests, presenting a surface for indirect prompt injection that is mitigated by local storage and human review.
- Ingestion points: Reads from
templates/hr-leave.yaml,templates/inventory.yaml,templates/procurement.yaml, andtemplates/sales-orders.yamlat runtime. - Boundary markers: Instructions mandate that the agent must present a summary for user confirmation before any
pilot.yamlmanifest is written to the filesystem. - Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
btpandcookbookctl, and writing to local files (pilot.yaml,generated.tfvars.json). - Sanitization: The agent is instructed to derive kebab-case identifiers and strictly follow user-confirmed architectural decisions.
- [SAFE]: The skill contains explicit instructions to prevent the handling of sensitive credentials.
- Instructions explicitly state: "Never request backend secrets in chat" and "never accept passwords, tokens, service keys, certificates, or API keys in chat or pilot.yaml."
Audit Metadata