sap-setup-btp-agent

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local vendor-provided command-line tools to manage the environment discovery and manifest generation workflow.
  • Evidence: Executes ./cookbookctl for pilot status, account discovery, manifest validation, and local rendering of configuration files.
  • Evidence: Executes btp login --sso to facilitate secure user authentication via the official SAP BTP CLI when a session is not active.
  • Evidence: Runs scripts/region-preflight/region-preflight.sh to verify service availability in specific BTP regions before configuration.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests configuration data from local template files to scaffold agent manifests, presenting a surface for indirect prompt injection that is mitigated by local storage and human review.
  • Ingestion points: Reads from templates/hr-leave.yaml, templates/inventory.yaml, templates/procurement.yaml, and templates/sales-orders.yaml at runtime.
  • Boundary markers: Instructions mandate that the agent must present a summary for user confirmation before any pilot.yaml manifest is written to the filesystem.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution via btp and cookbookctl, and writing to local files (pilot.yaml, generated.tfvars.json).
  • Sanitization: The agent is instructed to derive kebab-case identifiers and strictly follow user-confirmed architectural decisions.
  • [SAFE]: The skill contains explicit instructions to prevent the handling of sensitive credentials.
  • Instructions explicitly state: "Never request backend secrets in chat" and "never accept passwords, tokens, service keys, certificates, or API keys in chat or pilot.yaml."
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 05:00 AM