challenger-sale
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input such as company names, prospect roles, and objections to generate sales pitches and emails without explicit sanitization or boundary markers. Ingestion points: User-provided values for [prospect], [vertical], [stakeholder], [company], and [objection] in SKILL.md. Boundary markers: Absent. Capability inventory: File writing to the local file system. Sanitization: Not performed on user inputs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains instructions for the agent to perform a file system write operation to a hidden directory in the user's home folder. Evidence: The 'Emit Outcome Sidecar' section in SKILL.md specifies writing to ~/.claude/skill-analytics/last-outcome-challenger-sale.json.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill stores session-specific metadata and metrics in a local hidden directory, allowing data to persist across different interactions. Evidence: Writing to ~/.claude/skill-analytics/ is used to track 'last-outcome' metrics.
Audit Metadata