prospect-research-to-cadence-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data from sources like Apollo job postings and web search results to generate personalized email sequences and call scripts. This content is interpolated into outbound communication templates, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if external sources contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Job postings via
apollo_organizations_job_postings, peer customer descriptions viasearch_companies_by_description, and general web search gaps. - Boundary markers: The skill requires an explicit
AskUserQuestion(Stage 3) for human approval before any outreach is sent or contacts are enrolled. - Capability inventory:
apollo_contacts_create,apollo_emailer_campaigns_add_contact_ids, andgmail_create_draft. - Sanitization: Implements
check_my_copy(Gate B) andsearch_product_catalog(Gate S) to verify claims and brand consistency before presentation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads from local environment paths (e.g.,
~/.claude/skills/epiphan-house-rules-skill/reference/gates.md) to retrieve identifiers and house rules. While it pushes data to external services (Apollo and Gmail), these are the primary functional targets for the sales outreach use case and operate within a human-approved workflow.
Audit Metadata