cloudflare-vectorize

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's RAG and ingestion templates introduce a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where untrusted data could influence model behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The /ingest/url endpoint in templates/document-ingestion.ts fetches content from arbitrary external URLs. Additionally, templates/rag-chat.ts and templates/basic-search.ts retrieve data from the Vectorize database for use in LLM prompts.
  • Boundary markers: The RAG implementation in templates/rag-chat.ts uses structural delimiters such as [Title]\nContent and --- to separate retrieved context from the system instructions. While helpful for structure, these markers do not prevent an LLM from obeying instructions embedded within the retrieved text.
  • Capability inventory: The templates have access to the env.AI.run capability for executing LLM completions and fetch for making network requests.
  • Sanitization: Basic regex is used in templates/document-ingestion.ts to remove HTML tags, but no natural language sanitization is performed to filter out malicious prompts or instructions from the fetched content.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides code that performs network requests to user-supplied targets, which can be misused as a conduit for data or scanning.
  • Network operations: The /ingest/url route in templates/document-ingestion.ts accepts a URL from the request body and performs a server-side fetch. This represents a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability surface, as the code lacks an allowlist or validation to prevent the worker from requesting internal or sensitive resources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 14, 2026, 09:40 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cloudflare-vectorize