ultracite
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted project configuration data which is then processed by agents with shell and file-system capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads
package.json,biome.jsonc,biome.json,.eslintrc*, and.prettierrc*within the user's project directory as documented inagents/config-validator.mdandagents/migration-assistant.md. - Boundary markers: Agent prompts do not utilize explicit delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the read configuration content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses and utilizes
Bash,Write,Edit, andReadtools for diagnostics and migration tasks. - Sanitization: Ingested file content is not explicitly sanitized or escaped before being processed or used in shell command construction.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill scripts and commands execute shell operations necessary for project setup and migration.
- Evidence:
scripts/install-ultracite.sh,scripts/migrate-to-ultracite.sh,commands/doctor.md, andcommands/migrate.mduse theBashtool to run operations likebun x ultracite init,find,node --version, andnpx ultracite check. These are aligned with the skill's primary function of managing development environments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of development dependencies from well-known package registries.
- Evidence: Initialization and migration workflows install packages such as
ultracite,eslint,prettier, and@biomejs/biomeusing standard package managers (npm, bun, pnpm, yarn). These target established registries and the vendor's own official packages.
Audit Metadata