ultracite

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted project configuration data which is then processed by agents with shell and file-system capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads package.json, biome.jsonc, biome.json, .eslintrc*, and .prettierrc* within the user's project directory as documented in agents/config-validator.md and agents/migration-assistant.md.
  • Boundary markers: Agent prompts do not utilize explicit delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the read configuration content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses and utilizes Bash, Write, Edit, and Read tools for diagnostics and migration tasks.
  • Sanitization: Ingested file content is not explicitly sanitized or escaped before being processed or used in shell command construction.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill scripts and commands execute shell operations necessary for project setup and migration.
  • Evidence: scripts/install-ultracite.sh, scripts/migrate-to-ultracite.sh, commands/doctor.md, and commands/migrate.md use the Bash tool to run operations like bun x ultracite init, find, node --version, and npx ultracite check. These are aligned with the skill's primary function of managing development environments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of development dependencies from well-known package registries.
  • Evidence: Initialization and migration workflows install packages such as ultracite, eslint, prettier, and @biomejs/biome using standard package managers (npm, bun, pnpm, yarn). These target established registries and the vendor's own official packages.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 12:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ultracite