The Agent Skills Directory

[EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and install command-line tools from sources that are not part of the trusted organization list, such as github.com/Peripli/service-manager-cli and download.svcat.sh. It also adds third-party Helm repositories including peripli.github.io and svc-catalog-charts.storage.googleapis.com.
[REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides multiple methods for installing external tools that involve executing code directly from the internet, including go install github.com/Peripli/service-manager-cli@latest and curl commands to fetch and install the svcat CLI.
[CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The provided templates/oauth-token-request.sh template script writes the entire OAuth2 response, which includes the access_token, to a file named token_response.json in the current working directory. This practice can lead to accidental exposure of sensitive session credentials.
[PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Installation instructions for the smctl CLI suggest using sudo mv to place the binary in /usr/local/bin/, which requires the user to grant administrative privileges to the installation process.
[INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles untrusted configuration data in JSON and YAML formats for BTP service provisioning, which represents an injection surface. * Ingestion points: The parameters fields in templates/service-instance-cf.json and templates/service-binding-k8s.yaml are used to pass data to backend services. * Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are present in the provisioning instructions. * Capability inventory: The skill utilizes smctl, btp, cf, and kubectl to execute management operations, creating a significant impact surface if the agent is misled by injected instructions. * Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the contents of the service parameters before they are passed to the CLI tools.

sap-btp-service-manager