tt-humanizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided TikTok scripts and captions, which serves as a surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions could be embedded within the script to manipulate the agent, especially given its capabilities to interact with external tools and publishing layers.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted scripts and captions are ingested via the
tt-humanizer <script>input defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore any command-like text within the user scripts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to image generation and refinement via
lib.illustrateandrefineinsub-skills/illustration.md, and mentions a 'Publora' publishing layer. - Sanitization: There is no documentation of sanitization or filtering of the script content before it is processed by the agent's logic.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill contains Python code snippets in
references/scrub-rules.mdandsub-skills/illustration.mdthat define core logic for script scoring and tool invocation. These snippets represent a dynamic execution pattern where the agent follows structured code templates to perform its tasks, such as regex-based text analysis and image generation through internal libraries.
Audit Metadata