material-design-3-ui
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's installation process fetches components and updates from the vendor's GitHub repository (
skydashnet/material-design-3-ui-skill). This is a legitimate operation for deploying the skill package and its associated reference documentation. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
README.mdprovides installation instructions that involve downloading and executing shell scripts (install.shandinstall.ps1) from the repository. These scripts are used to distribute the skill package to various supported AI agent directories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation includes commands meant to be run by the user to install or uninstall the skill package. These commands involve standard shell piping (
curl | bashandirm | iex) to facilitate the setup of the skill's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process user-supplied design goals and information architecture to generate UI recommendations. While it handles external input, it lacks dangerous runtime capabilities that could be exploited via injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided design prompts and project requirements processed in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present.
- Capability inventory: The skill does not have tools or instructions for writing files, performing network operations, or executing arbitrary code during its runtime design tasks.
- Sanitization: No sanitization is implemented, but the absence of risky capabilities mitigates the threat surface.
- [SAFE]: The core logic and instructional content within
SKILL.mdand thereferences/directory adhere to official Material Design 3 guidelines. There are no signs of credential harvesting, exfiltration, or obfuscated malicious intent.
Audit Metadata