seedance-fight-director
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted user-supplied data, including descriptions, image references, and video references, to generate complex video prompts. This constitutes a standard attack surface for AI agents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via user instructions and reference asset handles like
{{Image N}}or{{Video N}}withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill employs a strict six-section output template (e.g.,
【角色/资产锁定】,【镜头语言总控】,【事件节拍】) to provide structure and limit accidental obedience to instructions embedded in input data. - Capability inventory: The skill is primarily instructional and does not define access to file-writing tools, network tools, or code execution environments in its configuration.
- Sanitization: The instructions enforce precise formatting for asset handles (e.g.,
{{Image N}}(...参考)) which helps in distinguishing data from instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a section on version management that references Git operations such as creating branches, committing changes, and "Syncing Git."
- These instructions are intended for maintaining the skill's logic across iterations and are presented as workflow advice.
- The agent is directed to perform these actions only upon user request (e.g., "When the user says 'sync Git'").
- There is no evidence of high-risk shell command injection or unauthorized system access; the behavior is consistent with a developer assistant persona.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references a external URL to a well-known service for technical reference.
- Evidence:
https://x.com/studio_oneroom/status/2075555056985010650inreferences/high-density-environment-fight-pattern.md. - This link points to a public tutorial/example on a well-known platform (X/Twitter), which is considered a safe reference for technical documentation.
Audit Metadata