machines
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands in Step 1 using node names extracted from
contacts.jsonwithout any sanitization or escaping of shell metacharacters. An attacker who controls the contents of this file could include characters like;,&, or|to execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant indirect prompt injection surface by consuming untrusted data from
$PSI/contacts.jsonand using it for privileged operations. - Ingestion points: The
mawandnamefields within$PSI/contacts.json. - Boundary markers: None. The data is parsed and directly interpolated into commands and file paths.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via the
mawutility and file system writes to the.claude/skills/directory. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the data extracted from the JSON file.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Step 3, the skill creates new directories and
SKILL.mdfiles under.claude/skills/based on node names from the contacts file. The lack of path validation allows for directory traversal or the creation of files in unintended locations if the node names contain path manipulation sequences such as../.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata