gmail-application-refresh
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is processing untrusted data (Gmail messages), creating a significant risk for indirect prompt injection. Maliciously crafted emails could attempt to override the agent's instructions during the parsing phase. While
OPERATING_CARD.mdincludes a rule to stop on detection of injection text, this relies on the model's self-detection capability. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/update_application_status.pyusessubprocess.run()to execute auxiliary scripts likemirror_to_sqlite.pyandlog_outcome.py. The arguments passed to these scripts (e.g., company names, roles, and outcomes) are derived from the agent's interpretation of external email content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
OPERATING_CARD.mdspecifies that the agent should 'Commit + push tracker after every 10 status changes'. This grants the agent autonomy to perform network-based Git operations, which could be leveraged for data exfiltration if the tracker content is manipulated via injection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/update_application_status.pyreads JSON state files from/tmp/apply_pipeline/run_state.jsonand/tmp/fa_run_state.jsonto determine 'predicted confidence'. If an attacker on the same system can write to these shared temporary paths, they could influence the agent's decision-making logic.
Audit Metadata