icp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements self-modifying instructions. According to
swan.md, the agent uses theswan-update-skilltool to rewrite the 'Setup state' paragraph inSKILL.mdupon completing the configuration process. This allows the skill to dynamically update its own logic to persist state. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
swan-execute-codetool to aggregate deal data and parse content from user-uploaded files, including PDFs using thepypdflibrary. This involves executing logic on data provided by external, untrusted sources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved from external URLs via
swan-fetch-scraped-urland from user-provided documents (Path C). - Boundary markers: The instructions include mandatory human-in-the-loop steps ('Show back, confirm, save') and 'NEVER auto-save' rules to prevent unintended execution of instructions found in external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to code execution (
swan-execute-code) and file modification (swan-update-skill) tools. - Sanitization: There are no specified sanitization or validation routines for the data fetched from external sources.
Audit Metadata