post-radar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content from LinkedIn (comment text, post content) via the
LINKEDIN_ENGAGEMENTtrigger andswan-fetch-scraped-url. This content is handled without explicit boundary markers or sanitization, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Trigger payload (comment text, post summary),
swan-fetch-scraped-url(post topic and angle). - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is not instructed to isolate or ignore instructions embedded within the LinkedIn data.
- Capability inventory:
swan-update-skill(can modify agent instructions),hubspot-create-task(write to CRM),reach-out(outbound communication),swan-execute-code(file access). - Sanitization: None; external input is interpolated directly into response drafts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to use
swan-execute-codeto read tool output files from the local filesystem (files/tool-outputs/<toolName>_<callId>.json). This involves dynamic execution and file system access. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
swan-update-skilltool is used to persistently modify theSKILL.mdfile's instructions (the 'Setup state' paragraph). While intended for configuration management, this self-modification capability could be abused to persistently alter agent behavior if the agent is successfully manipulated by external input.
Audit Metadata