timeline-report
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
node -eto execute an inline JavaScript snippet that reads and parses the~/.claude-mem/settings.jsonfile to resolve network ports. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
sqlite3CLI tool to perform multiple direct queries against the local database located at~/.claude-mem/claude-mem.db. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses files within the user's home directory (
~/.claude-mem/) which contain persistent memory logs and configuration data. These files are treated as sensitive as they represent the user's long-term interaction history. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted historical data (the project timeline) which could contain malicious instructions from previous sessions intended to influence the subagent.
- Ingestion points: The full compressed timeline is fetched from a local worker API and passed directly as context to a subagent in Step 4.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the subagent's prompt template.
- Capability inventory: The subagent is explicitly instructed to execute
sqlite3commands, providing a path to command execution if the input data is compromised. - Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or filtering for the historical timeline data before it is processed by the subagent.
Audit Metadata