scrollclaw-persona
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mandates that the agent ingest and copy verbatim text from external, untrusted sources such as Amazon reviews, Trustpilot, Reddit, and social media comments. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in these reviews could influence the agent's behavior or be written into campaign files.
- Ingestion points:
references/persona-research.mdexplicitly instructs the agent to spend time mining competitor reviews and social media threads for exact customer language. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute local bash scripts and write multiple files to the
workspace/directory. - Sanitization: The instructions require the agent to "Copy exact phrases — do not paraphrase," which increases the risk of copying malicious instructions directly into the script pipeline.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not provide specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to distinguish between user sentiment data and potential control instructions within the mined text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow relies on the execution of local shell scripts to manage creator profiles and process video assets.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains an explicit call tobash scripts/create-creator.sh <workspace> <creator-name>and references the use ofscripts/build-hook-demo.shfor video assembly.
Audit Metadata