media-digest

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted media content to generate text transcripts and summaries. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions could be embedded in the media content. * Ingestion points: Video, audio, PDF, and image files processed in scripts/digest.py. * Boundary markers: SKILL.md contains a warning for the agent to treat transcript and on-screen text as data, not instructions. * Capability inventory: The skill can write files, execute subprocesses (ffmpeg, ASR tools), and make network requests for cloud-based transcription. * Sanitization: The skill uses standard JSON parsing and serialization to handle tool outputs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and runtime error messages suggest installing the uv tool using a script from astral.sh, which is a well-known service in the Python ecosystem. It also suggests installing ffmpeg via official system package managers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes media processing tools such as ffmpeg, ffprobe, and various ASR binaries via subprocess.run. These executions use argument lists and avoid shell processing, minimizing command injection risks.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 02:57 PM