wordly-wisdom

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The SKILL.md file identifies the author as openai, which contradicts the actual source tristanmanchester. This misleading attribution leverages the reputation of a well-known organization to gain unearned trust in the skill's advice and security.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process complex, untrusted user-provided inputs to generate decision memos, forecasts, and script inputs without sufficient security boundaries.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided scenarios, plans, and criteria processed in SKILL.md and templates within the assets/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: The templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within user data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes local Python scripts (scripts/decision_matrix.py, scripts/ev_scenarios.py) and has the capability to write files to the local system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or escaping for user-supplied strings before interpolation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bundled Python scripts scripts/decision_matrix.py and scripts/ev_scenarios.py include an --output parameter that allows the agent to write the results to any file system path. If the agent is successfully influenced by a prompt injection, this could be used to overwrite sensitive files or configuration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 09:14 PM