wordly-wisdom
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The
SKILL.mdfile identifies the author asopenai, which contradicts the actual sourcetristanmanchester. This misleading attribution leverages the reputation of a well-known organization to gain unearned trust in the skill's advice and security. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process complex, untrusted user-provided inputs to generate decision memos, forecasts, and script inputs without sufficient security boundaries.
- Ingestion points: User-provided scenarios, plans, and criteria processed in
SKILL.mdand templates within theassets/directory. - Boundary markers: The templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within user data.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes local Python scripts (
scripts/decision_matrix.py,scripts/ev_scenarios.py) and has the capability to write files to the local system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or escaping for user-supplied strings before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bundled Python scripts
scripts/decision_matrix.pyandscripts/ev_scenarios.pyinclude an--outputparameter that allows the agent to write the results to any file system path. If the agent is successfully influenced by a prompt injection, this could be used to overwrite sensitive files or configuration.
Audit Metadata