elaichi-toolboxes
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes "synthetic tools" that accept input from an agent to drive multi-step workflows, creating a surface where untrusted data could influence arguments passed to downstream tools.
- Ingestion Points: User-provided data is ingested via the
input_schemadefined in synthetic tool configurations as described inreferences/synthetic-tools.md. - Boundary Markers: The documentation does not specify the use of explicit delimiters or instructions for the model to ignore embedded commands within the processed inputs.
- Capability Inventory: Synthetic tools have the capability to execute sequences of API calls (e.g.,
create_ticket,search_contacts) across different connections. - Sanitization: The skill employs JSONata templates (
args_template) for data interpolation but does not detail specific sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the input data before it is utilized in tool calls. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The synthetic tool functionality uses JSONata expressions (
args_templateandoutput_template) to dynamically generate tool arguments and format results at runtime based on agent input and intermediate step results. - Evidence: The configuration schema in
references/synthetic-tools.mddefinesargs_templateas a JSONata expression evaluated against{ input, steps }to produce the argument object for each tool step.
Audit Metadata